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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge: 
 
This bad faith insurance claim, founded on diversity 
jurisdiction, presents an important question of 
Pennsylvania insurance law: whether a carrier offering 
uninsured motorist (UM) coverage has a duty to pay an 
undisputed part of a UM claim while another part remains 
in dispute. However, because this case is before us in the 
unusual procedural posture of an appeal from a consent 
judgment, before we reach this question we must consider 
whether the stringent conditions for appellate jurisdiction 
over a consent judgment have been met. The case also 
presents an interesting issue of justiciability insofar as the 
consent judgment is founded on a settlement of the 
underlying claim under which the plaintiff gets more or less 
depending on the legal rule we apply on appeal. 
 
The plaintiff, Cynthia Keefe, suffered three injuries in a 
motor vehicle accident with an uninsured motorist. Two of 
her injuries--to her knee and to her shoulder--were clearly 
caused by the accident. The third, an injury to her wrist, 
was more difficult to evaluate because Keefe had a 
preexisting problem with her wrist, and it was not 
immediately clear how much of the post-accident condition 
of her wrist was attributable to the accident. About 
eighteen months after the accident, the defendant, 
Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 
Keefe's insurance carrier, settled her UM claim for the 
highest amount available to her under her policy. Although 
Keefe acknowledges that she failed to provide medical 
records regarding the preexisting problems with her wrist 
until less than a month before Prudential agreed to settle 
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her claim, she asserts in this suit that Prudential acted in 
bad faith by failing to settle her claims for her knee and 
shoulder injuries while it was awaiting more information 
regarding her wrist injury. 
 
At close of discovery, the parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment. In ruling on the motions the district 
court held that: (1) Pennsylvania would recognize a UM 
claim under the circumstances; (2) a reasonable jury could 
conclude that Prudential, in administering Keefe's 
uninsured motorist claim, violated its duty of good faith; 
and (3) genuine issues of material fact nonetheless 
precluded the entry of summary judgment in favor of either 
party. The parties thereupon settled the case and stipulated 
to the entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the 
amount of one dollar. Prudential now seeks to appeal from 
that judgment. 
 
We consider first whether Prudential waived the right to 
an appeal by consenting to the entry of judgment against it, 
but are satisfied that the understanding between the 
parties that Prudential would appeal was sufficiently clear 
to avoid waiver. We also conclude that the parties remain 
adverse and hence that this appeal presents a genuine case 
or controversy under Article III of the Constitution. We then 
turn to the merits, predicting that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would not recognize a bad faith claim under 
the circumstances of this case, and we therefore reverse 
and remand with directions to enter judgment for 
Prudential. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
In August 1995, Keefe was injured in an automobile 
accident with an uninsured motorist. The next day, she 
contacted Prudential to report the accident. Her policy with 
Prudential included $200,000 in UM coverage, under which 
an insured can recover damages from his or her own 
insurer for personal injuries sustained in an accident 
caused by the owner or driver of an uninsured vehicle. The 
contract provided that, if Prudential and Keefe could not 
agree on the amount of compensatory damages due, either 
party could make a written demand for arbitration. Subject 
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to coverage limits, compensatory damages are "the amount 
that an insured is legally entitled to recover for bodily 
injury but could not collect from the owner or driver of the 
uninsured motor vehicle," including damages for pain and 
suffering. Prudential's representative determined that the 
driver of the vehicle with whom Keefe had had the accident 
was uninsured and sent her an application for UM benefits. 
 
Keefe initially reported two injuries in the accident: an 
injury to her right shoulder and an injury to her left knee. 
Keefe underwent arthroscopic surgical repair of her 
shoulder in February 1996 and her knee in July 1996, and 
provided records regarding these injuries to Prudential. In 
February 1996, Keefe added a report of an injury to her 
right wrist. Keefe's wrist injury was the most serious of her 
injuries, but assessing it was difficult because Keefe had a 
preexisting condition in her wrist. In June of 1995, about 
three months before the accident, Keefe had undergone a 
partial wrist fusion surgery. Several weeks after the 
accident, Keefe visited her wrist specialist, who monitored 
her progress throughout the fall and eventually concluded 
both that the partial fusion had not healed properly and/or 
was aggravated by the accident and that Keefe required a 
full wrist fusion. Keefe underwent the surgery to fuse her 
wrist in April 1996. 
 The medical records that Keefe initially provided to 
Prudential lacked any information regarding the condition 
of her wrist prior to the accident. Without adequate records 
regarding the preexisting condition in her wrist, Prudential 
could not determine whether the wrist fusion was required 
because of the accident or because of the preexisting 
condition. As a result, Prudential requested, and Keefe's 
lawyer agreed to provide, medical records regarding her 
preexisting condition. Despite the fact that he had not yet 
produced the promised medical records relevant to Keefe's 
preexisting wrist problems, Keefe's lawyer asked Prudential 
to settle her claim at or near the policy limits on three 
occasions between March and June of 1996. These 
requests were for settlement of the entire claim, including 
the wrist injury. 
 
Keefe's attorneys finally made the full records regarding 
Keefe's wrist condition available to Prudential in mid- 
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December 1996. On January 21, 1997, Keefe's lawyer 
advised Prudential that Keefe was having financial difficulty 
and, for the first time, requested that Prudential make at 
least a partial payment. Keefe concedes that she never 
requested a partial settlement for the shoulder and knee 
injuries before January 1997. In response to this request, 
Prudential decided to make a settlement offer. By the end 
of January 1997, Prudential agreed to settle Keefe's claim 
for $200,000, her policy limit, which they paid her on 
March 3, 1997. Prudential represents that the decision to 
settle for the policy limits was made before it conducted a 
full review of the medical records and even though there 
were several grounds for believing that the case was not 
worth $200,000. 
 
In May 1997, Keefe filed this suit, alleging (1) that 
Prudential violated PA. Stat. Ann., tit. 42, S 8371 (West 
1998), Pennsylvania's law imposing a duty of good faith 
with respect to insurance claims; and (2) that Prudential 
was liable for breach of the common law contractual duty 
of good faith and fair dealing for failing to compensate her 
for her knee and shoulder injuries while it gathered more 
information about the preexisting condition in her wrist. 
Prudential counterclaimed alleging violation of PA. Stat. 
Ann., tit. 42, S 8371 (West 1998), and a breach of the duty 
of good faith and fair dealing based on Keefe's delay in 
providing medical records. The district court had 
jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1332. 
 
At the close of discovery, the parties filed cross motions. 
Prudential sought judgment on the pleadings, or, in the 
alternative, summary judgment, on Keefe's claims that 
Prudential violated S 8371 and committed a breach of the 
common law contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
Keefe sought summary judgment on Prudential's 
counterclaim. The district court denied Prudential's motion 
and granted in part and denied in part Keefe's motion, 
ruling that there were genuine issues of material fact 
regarding (1) whether Prudential ever placed a specific 
value on Keefe's knee and shoulder injuries; and (2) 
whether Keefe's delay in providing medical records 
regarding her wrist was a reasonable basis for the delay in 
payment. In so doing, the court concluded that a 
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reasonable jury could find that a defendant's refusal to 
make an unconditional payment of an undisputed amount 
of a UM claim while some additional portion of the claim 
remained in dispute violated S 8371. 
 
Prudential moved for reconsideration on this issue, 
arguing that UM insurers have no duty under Pennsylvania 
law to pay an undisputed part of a UM claim while any 
other part remains in dispute. The district court denied 
Prudential's motion to reconsider, but certified an 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1292(b). This 
court denied Prudential's S 1292(b) petition (in which Keefe 
had joined). The parties thereupon entered into a 
stipulation providing that the district court would enter 
judgment in favor of Keefe in the amount of one dollar. The 
district court entered a one paragraph final judgment 
pursuant to the stipulation, and Prudential now appeals 
from that consent judgment. 
 
II. Appellate Jurisdiction 
 
A. The Stipulation 
 
The stipulation between the parties does not settle the 
factual disputes between them. Instead, the parties recite 
their opposing versions of the facts and then set forth their 
agreement that the legal issue in question, i.e. whether a 
reasonable jury could find that a defendant's refusal to pay 
unconditionally the undisputed amount of a plaintiff's 
uninsured motorist claim constitutes bad faith, 
 
       is of sufficient importance to this case that[the parties] 
       have reached an agreement to resolve this case based 
       solely on the ultimate resolution of this issue on 
       appeal, without the need for trial. Under this 
       agreement: (a) The record for appeal will consist of 
       matters developed during discovery, as governed by 
       rulings of the district court in connection therewith. (b) 
       Defendant will pay to Plaintiff an agreed amount that 
       depends upon the outcome of the appeal, and 
       encompasses all contingencies on an appeal, thereby 
       allowing the entry of a final judgment by stipulation. 
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Although the stipulation clearly contemplates an appeal, 
the defendant, in agreeing that the judgment should be 
entered against it, made no explicit reservation of the right 
to appeal. We turn to the question whether the defendants 
have waived their right to appeal. 
 
B. Waiver 
 
This court has acknowledged the general rule that a 
party cannot appeal a consent judgment, as well as two 
limited exceptions to that rule. See Atlantic Richfield Corp. 
v. Sharon Steel Corp., 918 F.2d 434, 437 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(noting rule that a party can only appeal from a consent 
judgment if there was a failure of consent or the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the consent 
judgment); see also Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int'l, Inc., 
975 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1992) (party who consents to 
the entry of judgment forfeits any right to appeal from that 
judgment); Clapp v. Commissioner, 875 F.2d 1396, 1398 
(9th Cir. 1989) (same). 
 
We have never considered, however, the appealability of 
a consent judgment where the party seeking to appeal has 
made explicit in a stipulation its intent to appeal the 
consent judgment. Accordingly, we must decide whether it 
is possible to consent to judgment and explicitly preserve 
the right to appeal, and, if so, whether the parties' clear 
understanding that Prudential would appeal the denial of 
summary judgment was sufficient to preserve the right to 
appeal. 
 
Appeals from judgments entered by consent are 
disfavored because, as the purpose of a consent judgment 
is to settle the case without further litigation, an appeal 
would undermine the agreement reached by the parties. 
Moreover, a party "should not be left guessing about the 
finality and hence efficacy of the settlement." Ass'n of 
Community Organizations for Reform Now v. Edgar, 99 F.3d 
261, 262 (7th Cir. 1996). When it is clear from the 
agreement between the parties that the losing party intends 
to appeal, however, it is unlikely that an appeal will 
undermine the settlement agreement or catch a party 
unawares. Indeed, in some situations, the option to craft a 
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 settlement agreement that provides for the possibility of an 
appeal on some contested issue may facilitate settlement of 
other issues. Recognizing these principles, some of our 
sister circuits have held that a party to a consent decree or 
other judgment entered by consent may appeal from that 
decree or judgment if it explicitly reserves the right to do 
so. See, e.g., INB Banking Co. v. Iron Peddlers, Inc., 993 
F.2d 1291, 1292 (7th Cir. 1993); Dorse v. Armstrong World 
Industries, Inc., 798 F.2d 1372, 1375 (11th Cir. 1986); 
Coughlin v. Regan, 768 F.2d 468, 470 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 
Adopting this approach, we conclude that, when the 
losing party in a consent judgment makes its intent to 
appeal clear in its agreement with the opposing party, an 
appeal from a consent judgment does not undermine the 
settlement. Where the terms of a stipulation clearly show 
that one of the parties has an unequivocal intention to 
appeal, the court has "discretion to accept the appeal 
insofar as it relates to a prior (contested) order 
notwithstanding the [parties'] later consent to the entry of 
the final judgment itself." BIW Deceived v. Local S6, 
Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of 
America, 132 F.3d 824, 828 (1st Cir. 1997). Where as here, 
it is clear from the record that the parties stipulated to a 
consent judgment with the express understanding that the 
party against whom judgment was entered would appeal a 
contested issue decided by the district court, there is no 
reason to hold the right to appeal waived. Prudential has 
not waived the right to appeal. 
 
C. The Effect of the Stipulation 
 
It is our duty to assure ourselves of the existence of 
subject matter jurisdiction even if the parties fail to raise 
the question. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. 
Flaherty, 983 F.2d 1267, 1275 (3d Cir. 1992). At oral 
argument, we raised with counsel the possibility that their 
settlement agreement mooted the controversy between them 
or put them into a position in which they lacked the 
adversity necessary to meet the case or controversy 
requirement of Article III. The parties filed supplemental 
briefing on this issue. They also provided information on 
the terms of their private settlement agreement, which 
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reflected that Prudential has agreed to pay Keefe one 
amount if Prudential's argument prevails; a second (and 
higher) amount if we do not decide the issue; and a third 
(and still higher amount) if Keefe's argument prevails. 
 
We are satisfied that the settlement has not mooted the 
controversy. As the stipulation makes clear, the parties 
continue to be adverse regarding the correctness of the 
district court's prediction of the cognizibility of Keefe's bad 
faith claim under Pennsylvania law. They have, in effect, 
only settled a damages issue. 
 
In Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), 
the Supreme Court considered a letter agreement between 
two parties providing that, if the Court denied certiorari or 
granted certiorari and affirmed, the defendant would pay 
the plaintiffs $400, but if the court granted certiorari and 
reversed, the plaintiffs would receive nothing. The Court 
held that the agreement did not moot the controversy 
between them, reasoning that: 
 
       respondents continue to seek damages to redress 
       alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act. The letter 
       agreement, if approved by the district court, would 
       merely liquidate those damages. If respondents have 
       suffered an injury that is compensable in money 
       damages of some undetermined amount, the fact that 
       they have settled on a measure of damages does not 
       make their claims moot. Given respondents' continued 
       active pursuit of monetary relief, this case remains 
       "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of 
       parties having adverse legal interests." 
 
Id. at 371 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 
227, 240-41 (1937)). 
 
Like the plaintiffs in Havens, Keefe continues to seek 
monetary damages. The agreement between the parties here 
is an agreement to liquidate damages similar to a high-low 
settlement agreement, in which the parties agree on the 
minimum and maximum amount that the plaintiff will 
recover depending on the outcome of a suit. See United 
States Fire Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 759 F.2d 306, 308 (3d 
Cir. 1985) (describing a high-low settlement agreement). 
Their positions are truly adverse with respect to the critical 
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legal issue that they ask us to resolve, and the dispute 
between them is not feigned. Moreover, we have reviewed 
the private settlement agreement and are satisfied that both 
parties have a significant stake in the outcome. We 
therefore conclude that we have subject matter jurisdiction 
over this appeal. 
 
Our jurisdiction over this appeal includes review of the 
issue decided by the district court in the order denying 
summary judgment. Although an order denying a motion 
for summary judgment is an interlocutory order that 
cannot be immediately appealed, after final judgment the 
losing party may seek review of an issue decided in an 
order denying summary judgment to the extent that that 
ruling was dispositive of some issue relevant on appeal. As 
this Court has explained, "since . . . only a final judgment 
or order is appealable, the appeal from a final judgment 
draws in question all prior non-final orders and rulings." 
Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 858 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (quoting Elfman Motors Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 
567 F.2d 1252, 1254 (3d Cir. 1977); see also In re 
Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 90 F.3d 696, 706 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (holding that prior interlocutory orders merge 
with final judgment and the interlocutory orders may be 
reviewed on appeal from the final order). Thus, the entry of 
final judgment in this case opens the door for us to review 
the district court's order denying summary judgment, in 
which it ruled that an insurance company's refusal to pay 
unconditionally the undisputed amount of an insured's 
uninsured motorist claim could constitute bad faith under 
Pennsylvania law. 
 
III. Would Pennsylvania Recognize A Bad Faith Claim 
       Under These Circumstances? 
 
Although there is no common law remedy for bad faith in 
the handling of insurance claims under Pennsylvania law, 
see D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mutual Casualty Ins. 
Co., 431 A.2d 966 (Pa. 1981), the Pennsylvania legislature 
has provided a statutory remedy. The statute provides that 
 
       [i]n an action arising under an insurance policy, if the 
       court finds that the insurer has acted in bad faith 
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       toward the insured, the court may take all of the 
       following actions: 
 
       (1) Award interest on the amount of the claim from  the 
       date the claim was made by the insured in an amount 
       equal to the prime rate of interest plus 3%. 
 
       (2) Award punitive damages against the insurer. 
 
       (3) Assess court costs and attorney fees against t he 
       insurer. 
 
PA. Stat. Ann., tit. 42, S 8371 (West 1998). 
 
In the insurance context, the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court has explained that the term bad faith includes " `any 
frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay proceeds of a policy.' " 
Terletsky v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 
649 A.2d 680, 688 (Pa. Super. 1997) (quoting Black's Law 
Dictionary 139 (6th ed. 1990)). " `For purposes of an action 
against an insurer for failure to pay a claim, such conduct 
imports a dishonest purpose and means a breach of a 
known duty (i.e., good faith and fair dealing), through some 
motive of self-interest or ill will; mere negligence or bad 
judgment is not bad faith.' " Id. Therefore, in order to 
recover under a bad faith claim, a plaintiff must show (1) 
that the defendant did not have a reasonable basis for 
denying benefits under the policy; and (2) that the 
defendant knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of 
reasonable basis in denying the claim. See id. ; Klinger v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 230 (3d 
Cir. 1997); Polselli v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 23 
F.3d 747, 751 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Prudential asserts that an insured never has an 
obligation to make a partial payment on an UM claim, 
because the pain and suffering component of compensatory 
damages cannot be divided into separate assessments for 
each injury. Surprisingly, there are no Pennsylvania 
appellate decisions on this subject. The authority in other 
jurisdictions is divided, and in some cases deals with 
statutes markedly different from Pennsylvania's bad faith 
statute. It is useful nonetheless to canvass the cases, as 
they provide background and context. Arizona and Alabama 
have rejected similar claims, but the Arizona claimant 
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sought relief under an implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing (rather than a statute regarding bad faith) and 
the Alabama defendant was able to rely on Alabama 
decisions holding that there can be no undisputed amount 
prior to an arbitration award or the execution of a release. 
See Voland v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 943 P.2d 808 (Ariz. 
1997); LeFevre v. Westberry, 590 So.2d 154 (Ala. 1991). 
 
In Millers Mutual Ins. Ass'n of Illinois v. House, 675 
N.E.2d 1037 (Ill. App. 1997), an Illinois intermediate 
appellate court held that, where the parties disputed the 
limits of coverage, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in holding that the insurance company's failure 
to pay the amount of the lower policy limit to the claimant 
while litigation was pending--an amount it admitted it 
owed--violated an Illinois statute prohibiting unreasonable 
delay in paying claims. The parties did not dispute that the 
plaintiff would be entitled to recover at least the lower limit. 
In Kehoe v. Lightning Rod Mutual Ins. Co., 685 N.E.2d 255 
(Ohio App. 1996), the Ohio court of appeals held that 
whether a failure to pay an undisputed portion of UM claim 
for eleven months after a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff 
constituted bad faith was a question for the jury. Unlike 
this case, however, the claim there was for underinsured 
motorist coverage, and the undisputed amount that the 
defendant failed to pay to the plaintiff was the amount that 
the defendant had received from the underinsured 
motorist's insurance company before the defendant entered 
the case to protect its subrogation interests. 
 
Finally, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that, if 
the insured shows that he was not at fault, that he was 
injured, and that the other driver was underinsured, the 
insurer cannot refuse to pay any damages until the insured 
is able to prove the exact extent of his general damages, but 
must unconditionally tender the reasonable amount that is 
due. McDill v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 475 So.2d 1085 (La. 
1985). The McDill case, however, involved a claim that was 
clearly worth more than the $10,000 limit of the plaintiff 's 
policy, and the Louisiana statute at issue provided for 
penalties for any failure to pay a claim within sixty days 
after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured 
that was found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without 
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probable cause. See id. at 1088-89. In sum, the authority 
from other jurisdictions provides some helpful guidelines, 
but has no great persuasive effect in our task of predicting 
Pennsylvania law. 
 
At all events, we need not go so far as Prudential asks. 
Based on Terletsky, 649 A.2d 680, and the cases applying 
it, we are convinced that, if Pennsylvania were to recognize 
a cause of action for bad faith for an insurance company's 
refusal to pay unconditionally the undisputed amount of a 
UM claim, it would do so only where the evidence 
demonstrated that two conditions had been met. Thefirst 
is that the insurance company conducted, or the insured 
requested but was denied, a separate assessment of some 
part of her claim (i.e., that there was an undisputed 
amount). The second is, at least until such a duty is clearly 
established in law (so that the duty is a known duty), that 
the insured made a request for partial payment. 
 
Until a partial final assessment is made or requested, 
there is a reasonable basis for failing to make a offer of 
partial settlement: namely, it is unclear what the separate 
injuries are worth, or what the plaintiff would have been 
legally entitled to recover for bodily injury if the uninsured 
motorist had had coverage. A request for a partialfinal 
assessment or evidence that the insurer conducted such a 
partial final assessment is a precondition of success on a 
bad faith claim because of the subjective components of a 
pain and suffering award. As the Arizona Supreme Court 
has noted, "a personal injury claim is unique and generally 
not divisible or susceptible to relatively precise evaluation 
or calculation. The `pain and suffering'/general damage 
elements of a personal injury claim . . . are inherently 
flexible and subject to different and potentially changing 
evaluations." Voland v. Farmers Insurance Company of 
Arizona, 943 P.2d at 812 (citing Lefevre v. Westberry, 590 
So.2d 154, 163 (Ala. 1991)). 
 
Our decision in Klinger, 115 F.3d 230, 234-35, is not to 
the contrary. In upholding a jury verdict for the plaintiffs 
on an uninsured motorist claim brought under 
Pennsylvania law, it suggests the principle that there must 
be some undisputed amount before the insurance company 
can be liable for bad faith refusal to pay. Id. Klinger held 
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that "[a] rational jury could well have concluded that [the 
insurer], by not making an offer to [the insured] based 
upon some objective criteria it believed compensated 
adequately for her injuries, knowingly or recklessly acted 
without reasonable basis," but only after noting that "the 
extent of [the insured's] injuries had become clear" to the 
defendant insurance company. Id. at 235. 
 
The district court correctly recognized that Pennsylvania 
would require a plaintiff in Keefe's position to establish that 
there was an undisputed amount that the defendant would 
owe to her. The parties dispute whether Prudential ever 
made a partial assessment of Keefe's knee and shoulder 
injuries. Keefe argues that Prudential's records from 1996 
regarding the value of her injuries establish that Prudential 
had at least assessed the lower limit of liability that was an 
"undisputed amount" it would owe to Keefe. Prudential 
denies that these records establish that it had assessed an 
undisputed amount and characterizes them instead as 
preliminary estimates made with the understanding that 
some information was still missing, including information 
on the wrist injury. 
 
According to Prudential, without information regarding 
the preexisting condition in the wrist, it was simply not in 
a position to make anything more than a preliminary 
evaluation of Keefe's pain and suffering attributable to the 
accident. The district court ruled on the motions for 
summary judgment that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether, at any point during 1996, there 
was an undisputed amount that Prudential knew it would 
have to pay to Keefe. We view this decision as a 
determination that there was a genuine issue of material 
fact as to the first prerequisite we have identified, i.e. 
whether the insurance company conducted, or the insured 
requested but was denied, a separate assessment of some 
part of her claim. We agree with the district court that this 
genuine issue of material fact precluded summary 
judgment. Were this the only prerequisite that we predicted 
Pennsylvania would make for such a claim, we would affirm 
the district court. 
 
However, as noted above, we also believe that 
Pennsylvania would require that the plaintiff establish that 
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she had made a request for partial payment. Until a 
plaintiff makes a request for partial payment, the insurance 
company has no notice that the plaintiff claims a partial 
payment. Keefe argues that her requests for the policy 
limits "implicitly included a request for partial payments," 
but we are not persuaded that Pennsylvania is likely to 
consider it unreasonable for an insurance provider to treat 
a request for the policy limits as just that--a request for the 
policy limits. Cf. Kehoe, 685 N.E.2d at 256 (holding that 
question of bad faith was one for jury where there was a 
clear undisputed minimum amount that the insurer would 
have to pay on a UM claim, but noting that the insured 
made a demand for partial payment). This is especially true 
given that under Pennsylvania law bad faith must be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence. See Cowden v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 134 A.2d 223, 229 (Pa. 1957); 
Hall v. Brown, 526 A.2d 413, 416 (Pa. Super. 1987); see 
also Polselli v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 
23 F.3d at 750 (3rd Cir. 1994). 
 
Without a request for partial payment, and unless and 
until Pennsylvania recognizes a duty to make partial 
payments, we believe that an insurance company does not 
act in bad faith when it assumes that an insured desires 
settlement of the entire claim, at least where the contract 
provides for general damages, and does not explicitly 
require separate assessments and payments for separate 
injuries in the calculation of compensatory damages. We do 
not believe Pennsylvania would require an insurance 
company--on its own initiative--to determine whether a 
partial payment is due under an UM contract before 
information regarding all of the injuries has been provided 
to it. To require such initiative would be tantamount to 
imposing a duty on the insurance company above and 
beyond the duty imposed by the implied duty of good faith 
and fair dealing. Under the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing, the insurer need only "accord the interest of the 
insured the same faithful consideration it gave its own 
interest," United States Fire Insurance Company v. Royal 
Insurance Company, 759 F.2d 306, 311 (3rd Cir.1985) 
(citing Cowden v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 134 A.2d 
223 (Pa. 1957); the good faith standard requires that the 
evaluation of the case by the insurance company must be 
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"honest, intelligent and objective." Id. ; see also Shearer v. 
Reed, 428 A.2d 635, 638 (Pa. Super. 1981)). Under 
Pennsylvania law, a fiduciary duty higher than the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing does not arise out an insurance 
contract until an insurer asserts a stated right under the 
policy to handle all claims asserted against the insured. See 
Gedeon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 188 A.2d 320, 
322 (Pa. 1963); see also Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalia, 
3 Couch on Insurance S 40.7 (3d ed. 1995). 
 
When this requirement is applied to these facts, Keefe 
cannot make out a claim for bad faith under Pennsylvania 
law. As Keefe concedes that she never requested a partial 
settlement for the shoulder and knee injuries before 
January 1997, she cannot show that she made some sort 
of request for partial payment. Accordingly, we conclude 
that the district court erred in denying summary judgment 
to Prudential. The judgment of the district court will 
therefore be reversed, and the case remanded with 
directions to enter judgment for Prudential. 
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